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Brian Easton
Top After-Tax 
Incomes
The purpose of this article is to present some data on top 
after-tax incomes in New Zealand. Thus it is a companion 
to the preceding article in this Policy Quarterly, ‘Distribution 
of pre-tax top personal incomes’, which looked at before-tax 
incomes. That article found that there had been little change 
after 1981 in the market (before-tax) income shares of those 
on top incomes. This article reports that, nevertheless, those 
on top incomes had dramatic increases in their after-tax 
incomes and shares of total after-tax income in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. Since there was no change in pre-tax market 
income shares, these increases were due to changes in relative 
tax rates. 
tax) distribution from a sample of actual 
returns. As such, it covers only income 
reported for tax purposes. It therefore 
excludes income that is not taxed (such as 
capital gains and pension income in some 
years) or is attributed to other entities 
(such as trusts and private companies). 
Residents for tax purposes report all 
income, but those who are deemed non-
residents report only their New Zealand 
incomes.
The IRD provides a consistent series 
back to the 1980/81 (March tax) year. 
Data for earlier years can be derived from 
Department of Statistics publications 
Incomes and Income Tax (various years). 
However, before the 1970/71 year social 
security tax was not included in the 
database because it was levied separately. 
Thus this analysis only goes back to the 
1970/71 year, when social security tax 
was abolished. The year refers to the year 
of the return, not the year in which the 
income was generated, which is often a 
year earlier. 
For various reasons – such as those on 
lower incomes not having to file returns 
– IRD returns may not cover all income 
recipients. This does not affect those on 
top incomes, but totals in the database do 
not cover total income. Instead, the share 
of the income of the top is compared with 
household disposable income as reported 
in the national accounts. (Note that this 
has the effect of treating benefits and the 
Note that this article traverses the personal 
income distribution, not the household 
distribution, which may involve more than 
one person and children (Perry, 2014). As 
such, it parallels the work of Alvaredo et 
al. (2013), which Thomas Piketty uses 
in his Capital in the Twenty-first Century 
(2014).
The article also explores the political 
and social consequences of the increased 
share.
Data sources
The primary data source is provided by 
Inland Revenue (IRD), which derives 
the personal income (before and after 
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like as negative income taxes.) Data is 
reported below for the top 0.1%, 1% and 
10% of all adults (those aged over 15). 
This avoids the omission at the bottom 
of the IRD database. In the 2012 year the 
three groups represented about 3,500, 
35,000 and 350,000 people respectively. 
Further details of the database and the 
method are reported in the preceding 
article. 
Results
The overall results are shown in Figure 
1.1 Essentially, the pattern is that after-
tax income shares are stable for the three 
groups over time, except that the shares 
lifted markedly between the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. (In summary, each group’s 
graph shows two plateaus with a sharp 
scarp between them.) 
It is possible to tell a more refined 
story within the two outer periods, but 
for our purposes the dramatic change 
is the lift between 1987 and 1993.2 It is 
summarised in Table 1. 
The table may be interpreted as 
follows, illustrating the pattern with the 
top 0.1% column. In the period before 
1987 the top 0.1% had 0.62% of total 
household disposable income (which 
meant their average income was 6.2 
times the adult average). After 1991 their 
share averaged 1.68% (so their incomes 
averaged 16.8 times the adult average). 
This represented a relative increase in 
their income of 169%. Thus, the share 
in the later period was more than two-
and-a-half times what it had been in the 
earlier period, but not three times. The 
absolute gain amounted to $1.43bn in 
2011/12, equivalent to $6 a week per New 
Zealander (including children).
The gains to those below the top 0.1% 
are proportionally smaller, but larger in 
absolute terms because more people are 
involved. Although the boost to the top 
10% (including the 0.1%) is only 25%, the 
absolute gain is $7.4bn, the equivalent of 
about $32 per week per New Zealander. 
Summing the additional income over 
the last 20 years (and ignoring interest 
and inflation), the top 0.1% had an 
extra $19.8bn, the top 1% had an extra 
$46.8bn and the top 10% had an extra 
$98.7bn more disposable income than at 
the old tax rates. The top 10% includes 
the top 1% with their greater gains. The 
proportional increase in the share of 
those in the top 2–10% is 13% (or about 
half of that for the top decile as a whole). 
The big gains are to the top 1%, who got 
about as much as the remaining nine-
tenths of the top decile.
The impact of taxation
Since, as observed in the earlier article, 
there have been no dramatic changes 
in the distribution of pre-tax market 
incomes, the change in disposable income 
shares reflects reductions in the relative 
incidence of taxation. There were two 
main ways in which this happened.
The flattening of income tax rates
Before 1987 effective marginal tax rates 
on top incomes averaged over 50% (the 
official rates were as high as 66%), but 
after 1991 the rates were below 40%: they 
were 33% in the 1990s and after 2009; 
they were 39% in between.3
Imputation of corporate taxation
Until 1989 it was said that corporate 
dividends were ‘double taxed’. 
Corporations paid tax on their profits, 
and their dividends paid from the tax-
paid profits were treated as taxable 
income of the shareholder. To illustrate, 
suppose the tax rate is 50% and all the 
after-tax company profit was remitted in 
dividends. The calculation would appear 
something like this:
Company profit before tax  = $100
Less tax on profit at 50% = $ 50
Company profit before tax  = $ 50
Dividend = $ 50
Less tax on dividend at 50% = $ 25
Thus, the shareholder would only 
receive 25% of the original company 
profit. 
From 1989 there has been a dividend 
imputation system in which a shareholder 
receiving a dividend from a company is 
entitled to an ‘imputation credit’, which 
represents tax paid by the company and 
is offset against the shareholder’s income 
tax liability. The previous tabulation 
becomes:
Table 1: Shares of top income groups in household disposable income
Top 0.1% Top 1% Top 10%
1970/71–1986/87 0.62% 3.4% 18.4%
1991/92–2011/12 1.68% 5.9% 22.9%
Increase 169% 78% 25%
Absolute gain 2011/12 $1,430m $3,620m $7,420m
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Figure 1: Shares of top income in disposable income
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Company profit before tax  = $100
Less tax on profit at 50% = $ 50
Company profit before tax  = $ 50
Dividend = $ 50
Imputed tax on profit = $ 50
Total income reported to IRD  
(sum of previous two lines) = $100
Tax calculated on reported  
income at 50% = $ 50
Less tax already paid by  
company = $ 50
Additional tax to pay  = $ 0
Net difference between before and 
after the introduction of imputation 
of corporate dividends:
Gain = $ 25
Thus, the shareholder pays no 
additional tax on dividends in this 
example and corporation tax becomes, in 
effect, a withholding tax for shareholders’ 
dividends.4 So shareholders pay less tax 
under an imputation system. The two 
effects explain the marked fall in tax 
rates on top incomes in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. Despite there being no 
marked change in the before-tax shares 
of those at the top, there was a dramatic 
change in their after-tax shares. 
Were the tax reductions fair?
Economists rarely have much expertise 
in judging fairness. We therefore avoid 
making this judgement, merely observing 
that in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
there was a considerable shift in the after-
tax income distribution towards the rich. 
This is not a new observation. The shift 
was first measured two decades ago, but it 
was observed via the household adjusted 
disposable income distribution. That 
measure is based on a sample survey of 
households and cannot assess changes 
at the top with any precision. It found 
that over the last decades there has been 
a 20–25% increase in the income share 
of the top 10% of households (from 
about 20% in the early 1980s to 24–25% 
more recently) (Perry, 2014). All of the 
significant shift occurred in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, and was attributed to the 
reduction of income tax rates. 
This article reports on the personal 
rather than the household distribution. 
There is not a simple relation between the 
two: households may have more than one 
income recipient, and may contain other 
adults and children. Even so, the share 
of the personal distribution of the top 
10% increased 25%, suggesting a similar 
increase to household incomes despite the 
results being drawn from quite different 
databases. (That the change occurs at 
about the same time is less surprising.)
While this cross-check is useful (and 
comforting), the important finding from 
this research is that those at the very top 
experienced far greater income increases 
than is evident in the household income 
distribution with its necessarily coarser 
groupings. 
Was there an impact on economic growth 
from the redistribution?
The sort of tax redistribution observed 
here is sometimes justified in various ways, 
such as that it provides the investing class 
with more income to save and invest and 
increases the rewards for risk-taking and 
innovation by the entrepreneurial class. 
Two decades after the changes, there is 
little evidence that this happened in New 
Zealand (although there are caveats). Most 
fundamentally, there is no evidence that as 
a result of the policy changes made in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s New Zealand’s 
economic growth rate increased, as was 
promised by the advocates. Once the 
Rogernomics recession was over in 1995 
the economy grew at the same rate as it 
had before the measures were introduced.
Now it could be argued that the 
tax reductions on the rich accelerated 
economic growth but that the effect 
was offset by less successful measures 
(which?). However, the promise of growth 
would also predict that, following the tax 
reductions, the market (pre-tax) share of 
those on top incomes would increase. It 
didn’t (see the preceding article). This is 
puzzling. One might have expected that 
the additional disposable income would 
have led to greater savings, and that the 
consequent return on the investment 
would have boosted the incomes of those 
at the top even further. 
Among the possible explanations are:
•	 there	was	greater	investment	but	it	
was offshore and does not appear 
in the growth data (nor in the tax 
base if the beneficiaries switched 
their status to non-resident for tax 
purposes);
•	 the	increased	income	is	not	reported	
for tax purposes because it has 
disappeared into capital gains, private 
companies and trusts, for instance;
•	 some	of	the	investment	would	be	in	
housing (more below);
•	 the	rich	have	been	getting	a	poor	
return on their investment (possible);
•	 their	savings	rate	has	not	been	very	
high (discussed below as patterns of 
consumption).
There is an additional important 
caveat. Top income tax rates were falling 
in many other parts of the rich world. For 
a variety of reasons – the most important 
being the international mobility of 
highly skilled labour and big investors – 
it is impossible today to isolate the New 
Zealand tax system from the rest of the 
world and maintain high tax rates here 
out of line with relevant competitors; 
economic insulation is not what it was 
once.
Social and political consequences
Critical changes in social and political 
behaviour are associated with, and 
almost certainly (in part) a consequence 
of, the shift in the after-tax distribution. 
However, some of the phenomena 
reported below may have been incipiently 
developing before the tax reductions of 
the Rogernomics period. 
At issue is what those on top incomes 
did with their additional income (i.e. the 
$1.4bn a year for the top 0.1%; $7.4bn 
Critical changes in social and political 
behaviour are associated with, and 
almost certainly (in part) a consequence 
of, the shift in the after-tax distribution. 
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a year for the top 10%). Undoubtedly 
some was invested, although the previous 
section suggested that there is little 
evidence of a return on this additional 
investment in the available data. But 
certainly some of the billions would have 
been not saved but consumed. 
The difficulty here is that the research 
evidence suggests that above some 
threshold – well below the amount those 
on top incomes experience – additional 
consumption does not add to happiness 
or well-being. There are exceptions, such 
as better access to health care. And there is 
evidence to the effect that experiences are 
more highly valued than consumption of 
goods (scuba diving is valued more than 
the scuba equipment itself, if you are that 
way inclined). While consumption may 
not enhance well-being, however, much 
income can be a source of social status, 
and there is a need by the wealthy to 
demonstrate how rich they are. (There 
would be no annual rich list were there 
not, even if its coverage and estimates are 
erratic.) This gives rise to conspicuous 
consumption: the acquiring of luxury 
goods and services to publicly display 
economic power (income and wealth). 
Conspicuous consumption takes 
many forms, including the purchase for 
public display of assets such as housing 
and cars far in excess of reasonable 
requirements. (Such purchases may be 
described as investments, but they give 
no market return.) It may involve the 
hosting of expensive, publicly-observed 
events – such as lavish parties – while 
attention in the gossip columns, if not 
always welcome, also displays wealth. 
Hagiographies are commissioned; auto-
hagiographies are ghosted. Probably titles 
– reinstated in part by pressure from the 
rich – are not directly bought, but there 
is no doubt that there is an association 
between them and wealth. (Those that 
are awarded by merit enhance the less-
merited awards.)
Traditionally the New Zealand rich 
have contributed to the public wealth by 
anonymous donations (although there 
was a convention that less anonymity was 
appropriate in donations after death). It is 
difficult to judge whether such donations 
are more common today – probably, given 
the greater income share of the rich – but 
today there is little anonymity, which 
makes the donors’ status all the more 
conspicuous. (Note that the choices they 
make may shape activity in particular 
directions: acceptable art and writing is 
likely to be abstract rather than to depict 
political and social issues.)
Some of the surplus of the rich is 
used to defend their social positions. New 
Zealand’s largest think tank (currently 
the New Zealand Initiative) is funded 
generously by millionaires. Donations 
influence political parties. Meanwhile, 
alternative views are discouraged in 
various ways, including limiting the role 
of the government as a contributor to 
the public good. Given that the evidence 
of increasing economic inequality is 
two decades old, it is extraordinary that 
widespread public debate is less than two 
years old. Perhaps even more importantly, 
the public debate tends to be confined 
to options that not only justify the 
rich’s success but also ignore alternative 
possible developments. 
It may be either conspicuous 
consumption or political defence or 
both, but a feature of today’s political 
landscape is that three minor parties are 
overtly funded by millionaires. While 
money influences the public perception 
of the beauty, charm and intelligence 
of the wealthy, it is well to remember 
that commercial acumen (and luck) 
are not necessarily associated with 
aesthetic sensibility, political insight, 
and intellectual aptitude (or even the 
ability to form a coherent sentence). 
Fortunately, the rich rarely make claims 
of sporting prowess (except in yachting). 
An obsequiousness by the guardians of 
public taste (who are often rewarded 
by the generosity of, and favours from, 
the rich) results in the wealthy’s non-
commercial attributes being exaggerated.
Conclusion
New Zealand is a different society today 
from that of the early 1980s. In part 
this is the result of social and technical 
change and changing external relations in 
a globalised world. But some features of 
the change can be explicitly attributed to 
the rise in the relative incomes and wealth 
of the rich resulting from the changes in 
economic redistribution and tax policy 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This 
article contributes to quantifying the 
magnitude of these changes and tracing 
their implications. 
1 Pareto coefficients are not reported as they were in the 
preceding article. Estimates proved unstable, indicative 
that the after-tax distribution was not particularly Pareto 
distributed. If the before-tax distribution was, the after 
tax-distribution would be only if the tax regime was exactly 
proportional.
2 For instance, the rise in the top marginal tax in 2000/01 
depresses levels slightly.
3 The story is complicated by the removal of tax exemptions 
at various times and the imposition of the New Zealand 
Superannuation surcharge.
4 It was rare for a company to pay tax at the full corporation 
tax rate because of various rebates and exemptions.
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